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1. INTRODUCTION
I would be deeply honored to be appointed to any Chair, but I am especially
thrilled to hold the Chair named after a Supreme Court Justice whom I have long
held in the highest esteem, due to five interrelated aspects of his character and work.
I have strived to emulate his character and work throughout my career-of course,
never coming close to his achievements, but closer than I would have without his
inspiring example. In this article, I describe the five especially admirable attributes
of John Marshall Harlan.
II. FIVE ESPECIALLY ADMIRABLE ATTRIBUTES OF JUSTICE HARLAN
First, Harlan was ideologically independent, writing thoughtful, case-specific
opinions that eschewed any rigid dogma. To quote a Columbia Law professor, Kent
Greenawalt, who-along with Norman Dorsen-also clerked for Harlan: "No
modern justice has striven harder or more successfully . . . to perform his
responsibilities in [a neutral] manner."' Accordingly, although Harlan has been called
the Warren Court's "leading conservative voice,"2 he also wrote some of the most
path-breaking liberal opinions that any Justice has ever authored.' This is completely
consistent with the neutral, non-partisan approach that the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) pursues and for which I also aim in my work. For example, as my
students will attest, I drill them to be able to articulate all plausible perspectives on
all issues we study. In that vein, I quote an e-mail from one of my students, who
kindly thanked me for teaching "in a very balanced and fair manner." She said, "[You
opened] [m]y eyes . .. to things that I never knew possible. For example, before your
class I never thought I would see eye-to-eye with Justice Scalia on any issue."' Maybe
one can be too neutral! (Just kidding.)
A second admirable aspect of Harlan's work flows from his neutral approach: He
was unusually willing to rethink his views and to candidly admit that he had changed
his mind.s Norman Dorsen has written that this "trait [is] familiar to all of [Harlan's]
law clerks-his exceptional open-mindedness and willingness to listen to new
arguments."' Harlan thus embodied a key element of "the spirit of liberty," as defined
by another great jurist who also served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
1. BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 251 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006) (alteration
in original).
2. Jethro K. Lieberman, Harlan Without Relish, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243, 243 (1991) (book review).
3. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
4. E-mail to author (on file with author), quoted in Nadine Strossen, Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 1, 2 (2006).
5. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (revising the reasonable
expectation of privacy formulation from his Katz concurrence).
6. Norman Dorsen,John Marshall Harlan, CivilLiberties, and the Warren Court, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81,
104 (1991).
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Circuit: Learned Hand. In Hand's words: "The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is
not too sure that it is right . . . ."
As a civil libertarian, I have also been especially inspired by a third aspect of
Justice Harlan's work: his landmark civil liberties opinions. To be sure, Harlan's
overall record did not make him an ACLU all-star. To the contrary, he rejected
many major civil liberties claims, including many on equal protection and criminal
justice issues.' On the other hand, he did write trailblazing opinions upholding
certain constitutional freedoms, which have long been the focus of my own
professional work: freedoms of speech' and association;"o freedom to make our own
choices about sexual intimacy, reproduction, and other private matters;" freedom
from government-endorsed religion; 2 and freedom from government surveillance.
These opinions involve disparate rights, protected under various constitutional
provisions: several First Amendment clauses, which protect freedom of speech,
assembly, and religion; the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from
unjustified searches and seizures; and the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Nonetheless, despite their doctrinal and factual diversity,
all these Harlan opinions are united by the same overarching theme that he
consistently stressed in broadly construing all these constitutional provisions: that we
should be free from government action that intrudes into our private individual
sphere, where we can engage in our own chosen expression and relationships, both
personal and political.14
The fourth special quality about Justice Harlan that I particularly respect is his
legendary courtesy, even toward those with whom he strongly disagreed." In this
sense, Harlan contrasted sharply with Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was his principal
mentor on the Court.'" Frankfurter had a notoriously sharp tongue, not mincing
7. Judge Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (1944), in OUR NATION'S ARCHIVE 658 (Erik Bruun &Jay
Crosby eds., 1999).
8. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT
182-88 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
10. See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 497-99 (1960) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
13. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 779 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
14. Poe, 367 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15. Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Memory ofJustice John Marshall Harlan (Oct. 24, 1972), in 6 MEMORIALS
OF THEJUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 459, 475 (H. Kumar PercyJayasuriya
ed., 2009) (describing Justice Harlan's "unfailing courtesy").
16. Booknotes: Tinsley E. Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan: The Great Dissenter of the Warren Court, at 1:18
(C-SPAN television broadcast Apr. 26, 1992) (statement of Tinsley E. Yarbrough) ("[H]is principal
mentor, was Felix Frankfurter.").
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words toward or about those with whom he disagreed. Given this difference between
them, Harlan has been called "Frankfurter without mustard"!"
Harlan's cordiality is especially salutary in today's fractious political climate, with
too many personal attacks on those with different views, which have infected too
many recent Supreme Court opinions.'" I have tried to follow Justice Harlan's fine
example, and enjoy cordial and even friendly relationships with people with whom I
strongly disagree and publicly debate. I quote just a sample from one such person
whom I debated repeatedly, but who had to turn down the most recent invitation for
another such exchange for lack of time:
Dear Nadine:
I really miss you at the helm of the ACLU, but it's good ... that you're
keeping your hand in the public-appearance game. You're good at it. ...
... As attractive as is the opportunity to share a stage with you again, I
am going to say no [due to time constraints]....
Let me know when you are in D. C. Warm regards.
Sincerely,
Nino'9
Also inspired by Justice Harlan's neutral approach toward ideas and individuals,
I have enjoyed working with ideologically diverse organizations, including the
American Constitution Society and the Federalist Society, both nationally and at
New York Law School (NYLS).
This leads to the fifth way in which Justice Harlan serves as such a positive role
model: his close and ongoing relationship with the recent law school graduates who
served as his law clerks, including Norman Dorsen. Of all the wonderful professional
experiences I have been so lucky to have, none has been more meaningful to me than
working closely with students and continuing relationships with them beyond law
school. Many of my former students and research assistants are among my most
valued colleagues and friends.20
III. JUSTICE HARLAN'S PATH-BREAKING CIVIL LIBERTIES RULINGS
The remainder of this article focuses on a few of Justice Harlan's path-breaking
civil liberties opinions in the areas previously noted. As I always stress to my
Constitutional Law students, it is noteworthy that these pioneering rulings were
authored by someone who was appointed by a Republican president and generally
17. YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at xii.
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626-31 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
19. Yes, that was none other than Nino Scalia. This was just one of several gracious letters I received from
him. He died in February, 2016. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to author (Mar. 6, 2015) (on file
with the New York Law School Law Review).
20. 1 am so grateful to those who visited NYLS to hear me present the speech on which this article is based.
By way of example, I cite the two who made the longest trips: Dan Parisi from London and Danielle
Miklos from Rome.
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considered a political and judicial conservative-a Republican Wall Street lawyer by
background.2 1 Justice Hugo Black, a staunch Democrat, said that Harlan proved
"that there is such a thing as a good Republican."2 2
Of course, strong judicial protection of constitutional rights and civil liberties is
not, and should not be, the special province of any particular political outlook.
Rather, the Constitution should be neutrally defended by all of us, just as it protects
all of us. In fact, in quite a few of his opinions, Harlan took a stronger civil libertarian
position than that espoused by even leading liberal activists on the Warren Court.23
For example, in Cohen v. California, in which Harlan upheld the right to wear a
jacket in a courthouse with the then extremely provocative words "Fuck the Draft,"
he supported a more speech-protective position than the vaunted First Amendment
absolutist, Hugo Black.24 Likewise, in Roth v. United States, in which the Court first
created the obscenity exception to the First Amendment, Harlan dissented,
advocating a more speech-protective position than William Brennan, the archetypal
liberal judicial activist, who wrote the majority opinion.25
Moreover, while Harlan has not generally been viewed as a leader on civil rights
issues, he in fact was in the vanguard on some key cases in that crucial arena too. In
1958, in NAACP v. Alabama, Harlan wrote the Court's first opinion to expressly
recognize and protect an implicit First Amendment freedom of group association to
advance ideas in a case that was essential for the ability of the NAACP to pursue its
civil rights work.26 Furthermore, in the 1961 case Garner v. Louisiana, Harlan was
the only Justice to sustain a First Amendment claim by civil rights demonstrators,
who had been convicted for sitting-in at segregated lunch counters.27 No other
member of the Warren Court supported that ruling.
28
21. See YARBROUGH, supra note 8, at 339-41.
22. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 588 (2d ed. 1997).
23. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971).
24. Compare id. at 15-16, with id. at 27-28 (Black, J., dissenting).
25. 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see id. at 503-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the federal government
lacks power to outlaw sexual expression because of thoughts that it might induce "sexually impure
thoughts," id. at 507, in contrast with illegal conduct, although Harlan did uphold states' power to
outlaw obscenity).
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1959).
27. 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (9-0 decision) (Warren, C.J., majority opinion); see id. at 185-207 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (characterizing the sit-in demonstrations as expressive conduct entitled to
First Amendment protection).
28. See id. at 173-74 (majority opinion) (holding that the convictions violated the demonstrators' due process
rights because there was no evidence that their conduct foreseeably could have disturbed the peace); id.
at 175-76 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 183-84 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(maintaining that restaurants "are in the public domain," id. at 183, and hence barred by the equal
protection clause from engaging in "racial segregation," id. at 184).
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IV. COHEN V. CALIFORNIA: A MEMBER OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT PANTHEON
From among Harlan's rights-protective opinions, I have chosen to discuss the
ones that have the most direct ongoing relevance for current controversies. First, I
discuss his 1971 majority opinion in Cohen v. California. It is one of the most
eloquent, enduring paeans to freedom of speech even for words and ideas that most
people find deeply offensive. Therefore, it powerfully refutes the wrongheaded idea
that alas is widely accepted in our society, including on our campuses: that, far from
protecting speakers who are offending, officials should instead protect listeners who
are offended.29 I then discuss the specific examples of Harlan's rights-upholding
opinions to which the title of my article refers: his opinions that provide crucial
ammunition for upholding marriage equality and for striking down dragnet
surveillance by the NSA.
Harlan's Cohen opinion ranks among the handful of opinions in the First
Amendment pantheon. It persuasively makes several fundamental points in support of
broadly enforcing the free speech guarantee, each of which would independently
make it a memorable, quotable decision. In fact, the principles it enforced forty-six
years ago have since then become so deeply woven into our law that they might well
seem like truisms now. Therefore, I must underscore that these were novel ideas when
Harlan laid them out. That conclusion is underscored by the fact that the lower courts
had ruled the other way, rejecting the First Amendment arguments and upholding a
criminal conviction and thirty-day prison sentence for Mr. Cohen.0 Moreover, three
Justices joined a harshly worded dissent, agreeing that Cohen deserved to spend a
month in prison, and these three had overall pro-speech records.' Indeed, as I already
noted, one of them was a celebrated free speech absolutist: Hugo Black.32
I next summarize the then-radical and now-cherished core principles that Harlan
memorably staked out in Cohen. As I do so, consider how they relate to current free
speech controversies, including whether certain racist or sexist epithets should be
punishable as hate speech or harassment." First, that we must defend freedom
even-indeed, especially-for words and ideas that are deemed trivial at best, vile at
worst.34 Second, that free speech deserves defending even when it serves no
instrumental purpose, and conveys no idea to anyone, because it has intrinsic value as
an emotional outlet for the speaker." Third, that we cannot suppress any word
29. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22.
30. Id. at 22-26; People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 509-10 (1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 15.
31. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Black, J., and joined
in part by White, J.).
32. Id.
33. See Eric Heinze, Nineteen Arguments for Hate Speech Bans-and Against Them, FREE SPEECH DEBATE
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/nineteen-arguments-for-hate-speech-bans-
and-against-them; Students in Action: Debating Hate Speech, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
public-education/initiatives-awards/students in action/debate hate.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
34. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
35. Id. at 26.
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without also suppressing an idea, and that we may not suppress any idea. 6 Fourth, at
least when we are outside the privacy of our own homes, we have no right to be
shielded from offensive words and ideas, even when we are in places where we are
required to be, and hence cannot necessarily quickly avoid the offensive speech; in
other words, Harlan largely rejects the so-called "captive audience" rationale for
curbing speech." Fifth, that this robust freedom, even for offensive and upsetting
speech, is ultimately as good for society as it is for the individual."
I will quote Harlan's own eloquent words about that last point. He powerfully
refutes the widespread view that society would be better off if we could just outlaw a
few especially ugly epithets, and he does so despite acknowledging that such speech
has serious downsides. First though, to help you fully appreciate the force of Harlan's
courageous defense of free speech in this passage, I must provide some historical
context. I cannot stress enough that the particular words and ideas at issue were, at
that time, widely considered dangerously offensive. Back then, the so-called "F-word"
was analogous to the so-called "N-word" today: so taboo that polite people were
loath to utter it for any purpose, even to criticize it, or even, as in the Cohen case, to
defend the right to say it. For example, Justice Black's law clerks said that even this
staunch First Amendment absolutist was horrified at the possibility that his wife,
Elizabeth, would be confronted with "that word" in a courthouse corridor.
39
At the oral argument, Chief Justice Warren Burger tried to impose a gag order
on Cohen's lawyer, Professor Mel Nimmer, who was arguing the case on behalf of
the ACLU.40 After announcing the case and calling Nimmer to the podium, Chief
Justice Burger said: "Mr. Nimmer, . . . the Court is thoroughly familiar with the
factual setting of this case and it will not be necessary for you . . . to dwell on the
facts."' To which Nimmer replied: "At Mr. ChiefJustice's suggestion, I certainly will
keep very brief the statement of facts. . . . [Wihat this young man did was to walk
through a courthouse corridor . . . wearing a jacket upon which were inscribed the
words 'Fuck the Draft."42 As First Amendment expert Geoffrey Stone wrote: "At
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Id. at 24-25.
39. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Looking Back at Cohen v. California: A 40-Year Retrospective from Inside the
Court, 20 Wm. &MARY BILL RTs. J. 651, 655 (2012).
40. The ACLU played a leading role in almost all the cases discussed in this article.
41. Transcript of Oral Argument, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 299), reprinted in 70
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 828 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
42. Id.; see also e-mail from Joel Gora, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., to author (Oct. 6, 2015, 10:57
AM) (on file with the New York Law SchoolLaw Review) ("I [was] in the court room when the case was
argued . . . . [W]hen Nimmer . . . described the words on the jacket, in quite a clearly audible and
distinct manner, the ChiefJustice's face turned a bright crimson, almost matching the deep red curtains
behind the bench . ... ).
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that moment, I believe, Mel Nimmer won his case."43 Likewise, another commentator
said: "If Nimmer had acquiesced to Burger's word taboo, he would have conceded
that there were places where fuck shouldn't be said [including] the sanctified
courthouse."4 4
In contrast with Professor Nimmer, Harlan and the other Justices never let "that
word," as they called it, pass their lips. Burger himself referred to the case as the
screw the draft" case.45 Moreover, "[w]hen Harlan was to deliver the opinion in
open court, Burger begged: 'John, you're not going to use "that" word in delivering
the opinion, are you? It would be the end of the Court if you use it, John."'6 Indeed,
Harlan delivered the opinion without saying, "fuck." Even in guaranteeing the right
to say it, the taboo against it was just too strong for him.47
Again, I underscore this context-how deeply offensive the words at issue were
considered at the time-so you can appreciate that Justice Harlan's defense of the
right to utter them would apply fully to whatever we now consider to be the most
offensive words, which we also avoid saying even though we defend the right to say
them. Therefore, to fully grasp his ruling and rationale, as you read it, have in mind
whatever you consider the most ugly, unspeakable words today:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society
as diverse . . . as ours. It . . . put[s] the decision as to what views shall be
voiced . . . into the hands of each of us, in the hope that ... such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in
the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
. . . [T]he immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be
only . .. discord, and ... offensive utterance. These are, however,... necessary
side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate
permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal
cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot
lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a . . . distasteful
abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.48
In this passage, Justice Harlan strongly protects individual dignity and choice.
Notably, that is also a major theme that echoes through other opinions of his that
protect other rights, including his influential Poe v. Ullman opinion, which in turn
undergirded the historic 2015 same-sex marriage ruling, Obergefell v. Hodges.49
43. Geoffrey R. Stone, The World ofthe Framers:A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
44. Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOzo L. REV. 1711, 1735 (2007) (emphasis added).
45. SusanJ. Balter-Reitz, Cohenv. California, in FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES
ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 160, 163 (Richard A. Parker ed., 2003).
46. CHRISTOPHER M. FAIRMAN, FUCK: WORD TABOO AND PROTECTING OUR FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES 110 (2009).
47. Notice that I am not following in his footsteps in that regard!
48. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (citation omitted).
49. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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V. JUSTICE HARLAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO MARRIAGE EQUALITY
When I first read the Supreme Court's thrilling Obergefell decision, I was
immediately struck by the fact that it repeatedly quoted Justice Harlan's landmark
1961 opinion in Poe v. Ullman.'0 This underscores the special status of that opinion;
it is the earliest, most eloquent, and most enduring explanation of the Court's special
responsibility to construe the term "liberty" in the due process clauses as encompassing
protection from government intrusion into the private spheres of our lives. In other
words, the opinion justifies the modern so-called "substantive due process" doctrine,
which reads the due process clauses as protecting implied rights concerning sexual
and other intimate matters.
Harlan's Poe opinion specifically concluded that Connecticut's statute outlawing
contraception violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.s' The majority
of the Court had dismissed the constitutional challenge to the statute as non-justiciable,
beyond the Court's review power.52 Therefore, it is noteworthy that it was the
conservative Harlan who dissented on that point, concluding that the Court did indeed
have the power-and, in fact, the duty-to reach the merits of the case." Hence, he
went on to address the merits, and in so doing wrote the opinion that was the Court's
very first ever to uphold the implied right of sexual and reproductive freedom.
54
As I never tire of stressing to my Constitutional Law students, it was this
respected conservative who blazed this progressive path, not one of the liberal judicial
activists on the Court at the time. Harlan did this both by reaching out to rule on an
issue that the other Justices ducked, and by laying out a rationale for upholding
implied rights that has stood the test of time. This landmark opinion has often been
quoted and built upon, as the Court has subsequently recognized a series of such
implied rights,s including, most recently, the right to same-sex marriage.
5 6
To this day, we still have fierce ongoing debates about substantive due process,
with the four Obergefell dissenters maintaining either that the due process clauses
protect only procedural rights, or that they do not protect any substantive rights
beyond those that society traditionally already recognizes." The Obergefell dissenters'
views underscore how dramatically different the current brand ofjudicial conservatism
is from Harlan's. Justice Scalia bitterly denounced "the Court's claimed power to
50. Id. at 2598-99; id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 508-09 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. SeeJoHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.27, at 917 (7th ed. 2004).
55. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
57. Id. at 2515-16, 2518 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2627-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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create 'liberties,'"" and he put that word "liberties" in quotation marks just in case we
might not have understood that he did not think they really are such.
Likewise, Justice Clarence Thomas decried "the dangerous fiction of treating the
Due Process Clause as a font of substantive rights,"" and further said that even if he
assumed only for the sake of argument that the due process clauses did protect any
substantive liberty, it would be limited to freedom from physical restraint.6 0 Moreover,
all four opinions, by all four Obergefell dissenters, excoriated the majority for engaging
in judicial overreaching and undermining democracy by giving a broader substantive
meaning to "liberty.""
Given the ongoing force of this perspective both on the Court and off, including
among some current presidential candidates and their supporters, it is worth heeding
Justice Harlan's thoughtful exposition in Poe of a different view: namely, that the
Court has a duty to give substantive meaning to the concept of "liberty," and that it
can do so in a way that is appropriately restrained, consistent with the limited judicial
role in our system.
Harlan cited longstanding precedents and principles that repudiate the limited
views the current dissenters defend.62 Instead, he offers an elastic, but not unbounded,
concept:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula . . . . [It] represent[s] the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for [individual]
liberty . .. has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society.. . . [T]he supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has ...
not been [a process] where judges have felt free to roam where unguided
speculation might take them. . . . [Rather, judges consider] the balance struck
by this country, having regard to ... the traditions from which it developed as
well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A
decision of this Court which radically departs from [this living tradition]
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on [it] is likely to be
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute .. . for judgment and restraint.
58. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2633.
61. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law
is, not what it should be."); id. at 2614, 2617-18; id. at 2627-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The opinion in
these cases is the furthest extension in fact . .. of the Court's claimed power to create 'liberties' that the
Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention. . . . This is a naked judicial claim to legislative-
indeed, super-legislative-power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government."); id. at
2631-32, 2637 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("That a 'bare majority' of this Court is . . . wiping out with a
stroke of the keyboard the results of the political process in over 30 States, based on a provision that
guarantees only 'due process' is but further evidence of the danger of substantive due process. . . . The
majority apparently disregards the political process as a protection of liberty." (citation omitted)); id. at
2640-41, 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The Justices in the majority claim the authority to confer
constitutional protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is fundamental. . . . Today's
decision usurps the constitutional right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional
understanding of marriage.").
62. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541-42 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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. . . [This "liberty"] includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .6
Note Harlan's repeated rejection of reducing the due process clauses to a "formula."
6 4
That key point was also repeatedly stressed in the Obergefell decision.
6
1 Moreover, it
is a general theme that animates many of Harlan's opinions on various issues,
consistent with his overarching rejection of any rigid orthodoxy. He steadfastly
insisted that it is a judge's responsibility to do nothing less than to judge each case
and every issue.
Not only did Justice Harlan lay the cornerstone for Obergefell, but he also laid out
compelling arguments for shielding marriage equality from the major challenge that
it now faces: demands for religious exemptions or accommodations. These claims are
being raised by everyone from local officials, who seek exemption from their duties
to issue marriage licenses,66 to providers of products and services, who assert the
right to refuse to do business with same-sex couples."
Half a century ago, Justice Harlan rejected the claim that these sorts of
exemptions were required as a matter of religious freedom. He also went further,
arguing that these exemptions would violate the First Amendment's non-
establishment clause by conferring a special benefit on religion. For example, Harlan
dissented in the 1963 case, Sherbert v. Verner, in which the majority construed the
First Amendment's free exercise clause as mandating an exemption from a neutral
general law specifically when the law interfered with religious practices.
68 In a 1973
dissent in Walz v. Tax Commission, Harlan stressed that the First Amendment
religion clauses mandate strict neutrality as between religion and non-religion, such
that the government must not accord benefits that favor religion.69 In this respect,
Harlan took a more hard-line view of the establishment clause than the Court's
majority, which has enforced a so-called "benevolent neutrality,"a
7 permitting
government at least to voluntarily accommodate religion, and in some cases requiring
government to do so. In contrast, Harlan consistently opposed any "religious
gerrymanders."" Accordingly, he would strongly reject claims that religious objectors
63. Id. at 542-43.
64. Id. at 542.
65. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, 2620.
66. Sarah Kaplan & James Higdon, The Defiant Kim Davis, the Ky. Clerk Who Refuses to Issue Gay Marriage
Licenses, WASH. PosT (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/
2015/09/02/meet-kim-davis-the-ky-clerk-who-defying-the-supreme-court-refuses-to-issue-gay-
marriage-licenses.
67. Inae Oh, Indiana Pizzeria Says It Will Not Cater Gay Weddings, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:23
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/04/indiana-pizzeria-gay-couples.
68. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); id. at 418 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. 397 U.S. 664, 699 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. Id. at 669, 676 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
341
VOLUME 6112016/17
JUSTICE HARLAN'S ENDURING IMPORTANCE FOR CURRENT CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES
to same-sex marriage should be exempted from any general legal duty, including
under anti-discrimination laws.
As if the above-described Harlan opinions are not significant enough in terms of
LGBT7 2 rights, I note yet one more in that important genre. Justice Harlan actually
wrote the very first signed Supreme Court opinion upholding a gay rights claim, in
1962." This ruling is not nearly as well known as it deserves to be, even among
constitutional law experts, because it is usually doctrinally pigeonholed under First
Amendment obscenity.7 4
Specifically, in Manual Enterprises v. Day, Harlan repudiated the post office's
refusal to distribute so-called "physique magazines," which contained photos of
partially nude male models, as well as political commentary, aimed at a gay audience."
Harlan rejected the post office's view, which both lower courts had upheld, that
these magazines were obscene, and hence barred from distribution. This ruling made
an essential contribution to the then-nascent gay rights movement. To quote our
in-house NYLS expert, Art Leonard: "[F]olks who [study] the history of LGBT
rights all celebrate this [decision]. It helped to lay the foundation of the modern gay
rights movement, because it led to the development of a national gay press, which
had been impossible under the Postal regulations.""
To be sure, Harlan's opinion contains some disparaging language about
homosexuality that reflected the then-prevailing societal views.7 However, his
opinion was still way ahead of his time in a couple significant respects. For example,
he expressly equated straight and gay erotica, stating: "[T]hese portrayals of the male
nude cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than many portrayals of the
female nude that society tolerates." To quote a recent article by Rutgers Law
Professor Carlos Ball: "[Harlan's] analogy between gay and straight erotica provided
same-sex sexuality with a modicum of judicially approved legitimacy . . . that it had
72. LGBT is an acronym for "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender" that has been in use since the 1990s to
replace "gay" as a collective reference to the LGBT community. 1 RACE AND RACISM IN THE UNITED
STATES 690 (Charles A. Gallagher & Cameron D. Lippard eds., 2014).
73. While Harlan authored the first signed Supreme Court opinion in favor of gay rights, there had
previously been an unsigned opinion upholding rights for LGBT individuals. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241
F.2d 772, 776-77 (9th Cit. 1957) (holding that the material in "One," a periodical geared toward gay
men, was obscene and "ha[d] a tendency to deprave or corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open
to such influences"), rev'dper curiam, 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
74. See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Faced Gay Rights Decision in 1958 Over 'Obscene' Magazine, L.A.
TIMEs (Jan. 11, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-gay-magazine-20150111-
story.html (describing One, Inc. v. Olesen as "a little-noticed, one-line Supreme Court ruling in 1958
that didn't mention the word 'homosexuality' and was largely forgotten until recently," and as "a
forgotten landmark" of the gay rights movement).
75. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
76. E-mail from Arthur S. Leonard, Editor, LGBT Law Notes, N.Y. Law Sch., to author (Aug. 21, 2015,
7:06 AM) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
77. See ManualEnters., 370 U.S. at 481.
78. Id. at 490.
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never enjoyed before."79 Ball stated that this ruling was "the first time that any court in
the United States had ever suggested that there was an equivalence of sorts between
heterosexuality and homosexuality."0
Once again, the conservative Harlan was in the Court's vanguard in this
remarkable case, which was issued during the Dark Ages in terms of LGBT rights,
seven years before Stonewall." None of the Court's leading liberals joined his path-
breaking opinion. Justices Black, William 0. Douglas, Brennan, and Earl Warren
also voted against the post office, but they did so only on narrow statutory grounds.82
VI. JUSTICE HARLAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO FREEDOM FROM DRAGNET
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE
The next current hot topic about which Justice Harlan made amazingly prescient
pronouncements is electronic surveillance of communications, including the NSA's
sweeping, controversial surveillance that Edward Snowden brought to light." On
this topic, one Harlan opinion is well known and routinely quoted in all the many
ongoing discussions about whether mass communications surveillance violates the
Fourth Amendment. In contrast, another Harlan opinion on point is not nearly as
well known, which is too bad because it is a powerful indictment of the suspicionless
surveillance programs that the government continues to engage in.
Harlan's well-known opinion on point is his concurrence in Katz v. United States in
1967.84 The majority opinion in Katz was itself a watershed, because it held that the
Fourth Amendment does apply to electronic communications surveillance, thus
overturning an important earlier ruling that had reached the opposite conclusion
because it limited Fourth Amendment protection to physical trespasses." Katz was a
significant turning point; it recognized that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."86 Noteworthy as the majority's opinion was, even more influential has been
Justice Harlan's concurrence, in which he said that the Fourth Amendment extends to
all government intrusions that invade a "reasonable expectation of privacy," which he
defined as "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . .. that society is prepared to
79. Carlos A. Ball, Obscenity, Morality, and the First Amendment: The First LGBT Rights Cases Before the
Supreme Court, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 229, 293 (2015).
80. Id.
81. For more on the rebellion and its lasting impact, see News About Stonewall Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/stonewall-rebellion (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
82. ManualEnters., 370 U.S. at 495-519 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., and
Warren, C.J.); id. at 495 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. See Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC News (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964.
84. 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
86. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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recognize as 'reasonable.""' Just one year after Katz, the Supreme Court majority
adopted Harlan's formulation as the touchstone for Fourth Amendment coverage."
Unfortunately, while that approach was a step forward for Fourth Amendment
protection in Katz itself, as technology and society have evolved since then, the
reasonable expectation of privacy test" has often had the opposite impact. As society
has become inured to increasingly pervasive forms of mass surveillance, the definition
of protected privacy in terms of societal expectations has led to a downward spiral;
the more pervasive surveillance becomes, the narrower the reasonable expectation of
privacy becomes, so that more and more forms of government surveillance will be
deemed beyond Fourth Amendment protection.
This is exactly the argument that the U.S. government has been making and that
too many courts have been accepting, including in defending mass NSA surveillance
from Fourth Amendment challenges by the ACLU and other privacy advocates. The
government argues that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in our phone
metadata, even though it reveals the most intimate details of our lives, because we
should realize that this information is collected by our communications service
providers and that these providers might well turn it over to the government.9 0
In response, challengers to the surveillance have maintained that there should be
a normative dimension to assessing whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the
government intrusion at issue, not only a descriptive dimension. In other words, our
Fourth Amendment rights should not be limited to privacy that is already respected
in fact, but rather, it should encompass privacy that ought to be respected in principle.
That was precisely the point that none other than Justice Harlan himself stressed
just four years after Katz, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. White. With
his characteristic intellectual independence and rigor-including his consistent
rejection of simplistic, formulaic approaches-Harlan rejected the mere formulaic
invocation of the reasonable expectation of privacy concept, even though he himself
had penned that phrase." He stressed that the Katz formulation "can, ultimately,
lead to the substitution of words for analysis."92 Instead, he said that judges must
actually make judgments about whether the government intrusion at issue should be
allowed, consistent with the communications privacy that we should enjoy. In
language that is fully applicable to the NSA's dragnet phone surveillance, he said
that in deciding whether the Fourth Amendment applies,
87. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
88. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968) (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test).
89. Pursuant to Harlan's concurrence in Katz, the reasonable expectation of privacy test requires the
demonstration of both that (1) the person has an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and (2)
.society is prepared to recognize [this expectation of privacy] as 'reasonable.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
90. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cit. 2015).
91. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 779-80, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 786.
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[t]he analysis must . . . transcend the search for subjective expectations or ...
assumptions of risk ...
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and
reflect, we [judges] should not . . . merely recite the expectations and risks
without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical
question, therefore, is whether under our system of government .. . we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener . . . without at least
the protection of a warrant requirement."
Harlan then examined this critical question, and concluded that these risks would
exert an unacceptably chilling impact on our communications, a First Amendment
concern that the ACLU and others have also stressed in our current challenges to
NSA surveillance. To quote Harlan, "a rule of law that permits official monitoring of
private discourse" may "well smother that spontaneity . . . that liberates daily life";
spontaneity that is "reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant
discourse."9 4 In very strong language, which would condemn many ongoing
communications surveillance programs, he concluded that "[warrantless] electronic
monitoring . . . has no place in our society."9 5 Harlan elaborated that "the burden of
guarding privacy in a free society should not be on its citizens; it is the Government
that must justify its need to electronically eavesdrop."9 6
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I could wish nothing more for myself and my students-not to
mention for our cherished country and Constitution-than that all of us members of
the legal profession strive to follow in Justice Harlan's footsteps by being courteous and
respectful toward all people and neutral and open-minded toward all issues, and by
doing our utmost to secure rights that have not yet received the protection they deserve.
On that last point, I give the last word to Justice Harlan. I will quote a passage that not
only nods toward the past, as we would expect from a conservative jurist, but that also
ends on a forward-looking note, worthy of the most progressive jurist:
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against
a background of Constitutional purposes . . . . [T]here is no "mechanical
yardstick," no "mechanical answer." The decision of an apparently novel claim
must [not only] take "its place in relation to what went before [but also cut] a
channel for what is [yet] to come.""
93. Id.
94. Id. at 787-89.
95. Id. at 790.
96. Id. at 793.
97. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 147 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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